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CONCURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDISDICTION OVER LABOR DISPUTES
UNDER THE LINCOLN MILLS PRINCIPLE*
A. FREDERICK HARRISf
Problems arising under the Linwoln Mills1 principle'-that fed-
erally-formulated rules of decision apply when collective bargaining
agreements are litigated under section 301 (a)3 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act 4 -are slowly reaching the Supreme Court.
In its recent holding that state courts possess concurrent jurisdic-
tion to entertain litigation brought under section 301(a) the Su-
preme Court resolved one of these problems which appears on its
current docket." Another problem, yet to be resolved and more
important, is the concurrent power of state law-making functionaries
to prescribe separate rules of decision-possibly formulated from
conceptions more locally-oriented-for collective bargaining agree-
ments." Integrating each of these issues another way for purposes
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Paul J.
Mishkin of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for his helpful sug-
gestions during the preparation of this article. Responsibility for the views
expressed, of course, belongs with the author.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School.
'Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
As distinguished from the Lincoln Mills holding. See note 23 infra;
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MicE. L.
REv. 1 (1958).
261 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958): "Suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties."
'61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186-87 (Supp. II, 1961), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 154,
172, 178 (Supp. 1961) [cited hereinafter as the Taft-Hartley Act].
'Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), affirming 341
Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885 (1960).
"Compare Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), discussed in 65 HARV. L. Ruv. 1443 (1952), Swift & Co.
v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959), and
International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193 F.2d
470 (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum) (suggesting pre-emption of state substantive
law), with Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334
(S.D. Cal. 1953); see Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 110 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (D. Hawaii 1953) (indicating
survival of state substantive law).
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of distinction in a 301 context, they are: now that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction to administer the federal substantive law to
be spun "out of the empty darkness of section 301,"1 does state
substantive law governing collective bargaining agreements survive
and retain a viable co-existence in state and federal courts ?"
In sustaining the state court's concurrent jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court relied in greater measure upon the Taft-Hartley Act's
legislative history9 rather than upon arguments formulated from
scrutinizing the face of the legislation itself, which had earlier yielded
conflicting lower-court and scholarly conclusions."0 However, the
Court also recognized the tradition favoring concurrent jurisdiction.
This tradition can be traced to an observation of Alexander Hamil-
ton," and the Supreme Court had nourished it 2 to the point where
commentators assert that "where exclusivity [of federal jurisdic-
tion] is now intended, it must be found expressly stated ... or im-
plied ... in the provisions granting [federal] jurisdiction." 13
The Court recognized its own earlier misgiving in the field of
labor relations- that "a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of
procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting
adjudications as are different rules of substantive law,"' 4 but con-
- Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).'It has been. suggested that state law survives, either in federalized form,
see note 16 infra, or as the basis from which the new federal substantive law
will be formulated, see text accompanying note 16 infra.
" See Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of Labor Agreement,
7 'STAN. L. REv. 445, 454 (1955).
° Compare 'The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REv. 85, 178
(1958) (favoring concurrent jurisdiction), with Wollett & Wellington, supra
note 9, at 453, and Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 629 n.16 (3d Cir. 1954) (4-3 decision) (dictum),
aff'd on, other grounds, 348 U.S. 437 (1955) (denying concurrent jurisdic-
tion). See also Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959).
" .FEDERALIST No. 82, at 555 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton): "[T]he
state courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction.., and
I am even of opinion, that in every case in which they were not expressly
excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth."
"2 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876).
"s HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
373 (1953) [cited hereinafter as HART & WECHSLER]; see also 71 HARV. L.
REv. 1169 (1958).
' Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). Note, how-
ever, that the Garner case held state labor relations law pre-empted by areas
covered by the federal administrative machinery, and was not, according to
the Charles Dowd opinion, authority for pre-emption of state judicial juris-
diction to enforce federal judicially-formulated law.
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cluded that this fear must yield to clearly expressed congressional
intent.
One early misgiving about conferring concurrent 301(a) juris-
diction upon the state courts was that "the absence of a detailed
doctrine of federal labor contract obligations would relegate state
forums from time to time to the predicament of not knowing what
the controlling federal law is during the interim before federal
courts have declared it. .. ."' Although this fear was mitigated in
part by the Lincoln Mills opinion which predicted that "state law,
if compatible with the purpose of section 301, may be resorted to in
order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy,' 6
which was reiterated by the Charles Dowd opinion, almost five years
have passed since Lincoln Mills and still "the number of cases de-
cided under section 301 is still too few to permit the statement of
[even] broad principles of the emerging law."'" Those principles
which have since emerged from the Supreme Court, itself, however,
have shown no diffidence in derogating state judicials or statutory 9
law.
"Note, Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act: A Constitutional Prob-
lem of Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YALE L.J. 630, 636 n.23 (1948). The oppo-
site problem vexes federal courts which must apply state law in diversity liti-
gation. See HART & WECHSLER 628. ,
26 353 U.S. at 457. It has been suggested that section 301 (a) federalized
state law by incorporating it by reference. Textile Workers Union v. Ameri-
can Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D. Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.).
But see Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d
806 (2nd Cir. 1950), rejecting requirement of -"bad faith" which state law
made a condition precedent to action for work-stoppage damages. And lower
federal courts which foresaw the Lincoln Mills holding had ignored, in sec-
tion 301 actions, state law affecting the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments. Compare Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Ry. Employees, 106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1952) (state law favored
arbitration), with Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626
(M.D.N.C. 1950) (state law denied arbitration enforcement).
" Comment, The Emergent Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts:
A Survey of the Law Under Section 301, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 707, 733 (1961).
8 See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960), holding that
union welfare-fund trustees, third-party beneficiaries of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, were not subject, in an action for payments against the obli-
gor-company, to a set-off for damages suffered by a breach of contract on the
part of the obligee-union. Compare Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,
and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II, 59 CoLJm. L. REV. 276
& n.217 (1959), with Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and The
Lincoln Mills Case, 42 MINN. L. Rv. 333, 374 (1958). The Supreme Court
apparently resolved an issue, which had caused conflict, of whether non-
signatories to a collective bargaining agreement could, at least in certain in-
stances, sue upon it. Compare Teamsters Union v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 270
F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1959) (allowing individual employer non-signatories
represented by employer association to sue), with Ketcher v. Sheet Metal
19621
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Meanwhile, the state courts in the interim enthusiastically had
taken jurisdiction of suits brought under section 301 (a)," had
granted equitable relief to suitors,2 and have deemed themselves
restrained in entertaining section 301(a) litigation only by state
procedural limitations such as inability of the defendant union to be
sued as a jural entity under state law22 and potentially by state law
prohibiting specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate.23
One remedial power which state courts have exercised after hear-
ing section 301(a) is the injunction against a labor union's breach
of a "no strike" clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 24 Com-
mentators had debated the propriety of this action in the absence of
certainty as to what federal courts would be permitted to do in like
situations.25 And although the Supreme Court recently held that
Workers Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953). An allied question,
which is inconclusive, is whether state or federal law determines the status of
one claiming to be a third party beneficiary. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local
1291, Intl Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 499 (3d Cir. 1953) (diversity
also present).
"9 Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), aff'd on rehearing,
362 U.S. 605 (1960) (per curiam), holding respectively that Ohio anti-trust
laws could not prevent enforcement of a contractual minimum truck rental by
owner-drivers and owner-lessees. For a presentation of the issues raised by
the decisions see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdic-
tion over Labor Relations: I, 59 CoLum. L. R~v. 6, 51-52 n.162 (1959).
For a rationalization of the cases on the ground that state law went too far
in interfering with the process, as contrasted with the terms of collective
bargaining (cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)), see Merrifield, Fed-
eral-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations Law, 29 GEo. WAsr. L. Rnv. 318,
345-46 & nn.138 & 139 (1960).
" McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.
2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Coleman Co. v.
UAW, 181 Kan. 969, 317 P.2d 831 (1957); Harbison-Walker Refractories
Co. v. United. Brick & Clay Workers, 339 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1960) ; McLean
Distrib. Co. v. Brewery & Beverage Drivers Union, 254 Minn. 204, 94
N.W.2d 514, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959); Anchor Motor Freight N.Y.
Corp. v. Teamsters Union, 12 Misc. 2d 757, 171 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 171 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div. 1958); General Elec. Co. v. UAW, 93
Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110
N.E.2d 424 (1953); Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102,
348 P.2d 1112 (1960); General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local 542, 370
Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952).
" See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 829 (1953).
2 See Bunch v. Launius, 222 Ark. 760, 262 S.W.2d 461 (1953).
2 Byars v. Sealtest Foods Div., Nat'l Dairy Prod. Corp., 42 CCH Lab.
Cas. 16858 (Ala. Cir. 4. 1961); see The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71
HA v. L. REv. 85, 178 (1958). But see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
Cf. Mondou v. New York N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). That arbi-
tration agreements are specifically enforceable as a doctrine of federal sub-
stantive labor law was the holding of Lincoln Mills.
" McCarroll v. Los Angeles Co. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957) ; Comment, 71 HA v. L. REv. 1172 (1958).
" Compare Winter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The
[Vol. 41
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federal courts are prohibited by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act2" from granting like relief2" even though they do award damages
for such breach,2" at least the dissenting opinion in that case con-
Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 100-02 (1960)
(favoring separate state court injunctive power), with The Supreme Court,
1956 Termn, 71 HARv. L. REv. 85, 178 (1958) (disapproving separate state
court injunctive power).
2047 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
2" Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), affirning 290 F.2d
312 (7th Cir. 1961), abrogating Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight
Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960) and approving, A.H. Bull S.S. Co.
v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2nd Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 932 (1958). Although the Court did not attempt to do so, these three
cases may be distinguishable from the viewpoint of the union's motivation
for the strike and alternative methods of redress. In the Yellow Transit
case, the Tenth Circuit approved an injunction; the strike resulted from the
refusal of organized employees to cross a picket line established for the pur-
pose of organizing other non-union employees. In the Sinclair Refining
case, the Seventh Circuit forbade injunction of a strike either motivated in
part or continued because of a breakdown in arbitration procedure. The
Bull Steamship case resulted in the Second Circuit refusing to enjoin a
strike called because the union unsuccessfully attempted to renegotiate wages
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement. The facts in the Sin-
clair Refining case suggest a qualitative solution: since the union had in that
case alternative redress for its complaint via the grievance procedure, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act should be held no bar and a strike injunction should
issue since the effect would prod the union into pressing its alternative arbi-
tration remedy. One problem arising from this approach is whether the dis-
trict court's judgment in granting the injunction is res judicata before the
arbitrator when the latter subsequently ponders his jurisdiction to arbitrate
the dispute. See Note, 59 CoT~um. L. REv. 153, 171-73 (1959). Another
question occurs because the Lincoln Mills court decreed arbitration agree-
ments specifically enforceable notwithstanding that the alternative remedy of
an action for damages presumably was available to the petitioning party. It
is true that the Lincoln Mills action-at-law alternative lacks the appeal to the
Supreme Court that the alternative of arbitration holds. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). But the
Sinclair Refining Company likewise may have had alternative prospective
relief. The National Labor Relations Board holds a strike in violation of a
contractual "no strike" clause an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of section 8(b) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. NLRB v. UMW, 117 N.L.R.B.
1095 (1957), enforcement denied on other grounds, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (2-1 decision) (NLRB may not infer a "no-strike" clause). Contra,
McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No-Man's Land" of Labor
Law, 44 MINN. L. REv. 205, 228 (1959), suggesting that the court of appeals
decision rested on the ground that the strike was no Taft-Hartley Act vio-
lation. Compare Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962),
holding that a strike where alternative arbitration procedure for redress
exists violates collective bargaining agreement even in the absence of an
express "no-strike" clause. The opinion relied upon five court of appeals
decisions, among which was Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 259 F.2d 346 (6th
Cir. 1958) (Potter Stewart, C.J.), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 361 U.S.
459 (1960), which purported to be directly contra to the NLRB v. UMW
case decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
"' Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956), affirming 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955),
19621
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sidered it an open question whether state courts could exercise their
separate injunctive power.2 9 The argument that the Sinclair Re-
fining case does not preclude state courts from granting the injunc-
tion does not rest necessarily on the ground that Congress is power-
less to restrict state courts in this regard but rather from an interpre-
tation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which reflects a congressional
intention not to do so."
A question less exploited than concurrent state jurisdiction or
remedies is that of the survival of co-existent state-authored substan-
tive rules for decision in the litigation of collective bargaining agree-
ments which are also subject to federal rules of decision by virtue
of their susceptibility to being litigated under section 301. The po-
tential awkwardness of such a survival has been suggested by "sup-
posing that a complaint, making no reference to section 301 but
purporting to be grounded upon state law, is filed in a state court."''
and 126 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1954). The Mead case is criticized in Note,
66 YALE L.J. 284 (1956). But see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Ameri-
can Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). When a complaint requested
damages plus a strike injunction from a federal court which thought the
Norris-LaGuardia Act forbade the latter relief, the court dismissed without
prejudice that portion of the complaint seeking injunctive relief and took
cognizance of the claim for damages, despite an argument that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act tainted the entire proceeding. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v.
Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). Accord, Swift & Co. v.
United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959), granting
plaintiff's motion to remand as to that portion of the complaint seeking injunc-
tion for breach of "no-strike" contract clause.
" Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
o See Meltzer, supra note 18 at 279-81; Swift & Co. v. United Packing-
house Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959) (by implication). An-
other interesting issue is whether, should the Sinclair Refining case have
gone contra or be legislatively overruled-and federal courts allowed to en-
join such strikes-state courts in jurisdictions having "little" Norris-La-
Guardia acts could refuse to issue the injunction even though properly issued
by a federal court. This problem resembles that of state courts refusing to
consider labor unions as jural entities in the face of congressional action to
the contrary, see footnote 47 infra and accompanying text. The doctrinal
starting-points seem to be that while a state court having taken jurisdiction
over a federal claim cannot disdain to grant a federal remedy because state
law forbids, see note 23 supra and accompanying text, it does not follow that
a state may not, in the absence of clearly contrary congressional intent not
present here, withdraw jurisdiction from its courts to hear, among others,
certain federal claims, see Douglas v. New York, N.H., & H.R.R., 279 U.S.
377, 387-88 (1929) (dictum) ; Meltzer, supra note 18 at 280, n.236, provided
that the jurisdiction is not withdrawn in such a manner as to establish a
pattern of discrimination vis-A-vis federally-based claims while simultaneously
abiding in favor of similar claims grounded in state law, McKnett v. St.
Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). The Charles Dowd opinion expressly
disclaimed the issue, 368 U.S. at 514.
" Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement,
[Vol. 41
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But this example does not exhaust the problem which may occur in
the event a litigant may choose between (1) compelling a federal
judge to don his "federal question" robe by invoking section 301, or
alternatively, (2) compelling him to act as "in effect, only another
court of the State""2 by asking him to don his "diversity of citizen-
ship" robe and to obey the concomitant admonition that "the source
of substantive rights enforced by a federal court under diversity
jurisdiction ... is the law of the States."
' 3
Before a litigant bent on the latter choice can succeed he must
resolve certain procedural problems which unincorporated associa-
tions such as labor unions traditionally have created in the courts. 4
For example, in complying with the requirements of diversity of
citizenship in order to gain access to a federal court 5 it has been the
rule that the citizenship of an unincorporated labor union for pur-
poses of diversity of citizenship is the citizenship of the individual
members. 6  In order to fulfill federal venue requirements-that the
action be brought "only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside"7---the court should look to wherever any
substantial part of the unincorporated labor association's activities
are substantially carried on in order to ascertain its residence.38
7 STAN. L. REv. 445, 452 (1955). This remains a theoretical possibility not-
withstanding the Charles Dowd opinion." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
"'Id. at 112.
" See Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33
YALE L.J. 383 (1924); Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the
Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941); Comment, 68 YALE
L.J. 1182 (1959).
"'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958).
"'E.g., Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.
1932), aff'd on other grounds, 289 U.S. 103 (1933) ; Green v. Gravatt, 34 F.
Supp. 832 (W.D. Pa. 1940). Therefore, federal courts have applied the
rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806)-that diver-
sity of citizenship must be complete as between all the parties plaintiff, on one
side, and all the parties defendant, on the other side-remorselessly to un-
incorporated labor unions to defeat diversity jurisdiction; see, e.g., Russell
v. Central Labor Union, 1 F.2d 412 (E.D. Ill. 1924); 3 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 18.07, 19, 20.04, 20.07 (2d ed. 1953).
"'28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958).
See Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
831 (1960). Curiously, this is a relaxation-of the rule which has not been
altogether forthcoming in "federal question" litigation, where the stricter
rule that the location of the association's principal office determines "resi-
dence" for venue purposes has found adherence. McNutt v. United Gas
Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Griffin v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
88 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1949); Salvant v. Louisville & N.R.R., 83 F.
Supp. 391 (W.D. Ky. 1949); see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
1962]
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The method utilized to circumvent these procedural problems has
been the class action,"0 permissible by or against representatives of
a class "if persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the court . . .when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class
is joint or common ....""
A majority of the lower federal courts which have considered the
issue41 have concluded that class actions in behalf of and against
unincorporated labor unions survive the enactment of, and co-exist
with, section 301 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that
"any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States."'42 The germinal case on the matter, although not a section
301 (a) suit, pointed out that "the language used [in section 301 (b)]
is expressly permissive: 'nay sue or be sued as an entity . . . .' ""
Enginemen v. Graham, 175 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). Contra, American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see Sperry Prods., Inc. v.
Association of American R.R., 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942). The courts
have not expressed whether the basis of jurisdiction is a possible ground for
distinction between them. Thus, the Portsmouth Baseball Corp. case ex-
pressly disapproved the McNutt, Griffin, and Salvant cases without sug-
gesting the distinction; the American Airlines case expressly approved the
Portsmouth Baseball Corp. case without mentioning the distinction.
"See 3 MooE, op. cit. supra note 36, 23.02. Diversity of citizenship
in class actions is determined by the citizenship of the named representatives
of the unincorporated labor union. Lowery v. International Bhd. of Boiler-
makers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958); Webster v. Wilke, 186 F. Supp. 199
(S.D. Ill. 1960); Philadelphia Local 192 v. American Fed'n of Teachers, 44
F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Contra, Shelvey v. Barto, 16 FE-D. RuLE's
LAw 23a.61 (Case 1) (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (entire membership standard ad-
hered to in determining citizenship in class action). Venue is determined
by the residence, likewise, of the named representatives. Underwood v.
Delaney, 170 F. Supp. 21 (D. Del. 1958), rejecting a claim that, when the
unincorporated labor union is represented by a class, the proper venue cri-
terion is any district in which substantial activities are substantially carried
on by the association, just as though the association itself were the party of
record; Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Teamsters Union, 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D.
Ala. 1956), dismissing action as to a named class representative who was
not an indispensable party in order to preserve proper venue.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
"Burgos v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 189 F. Supp. 683 (D. Puerto Rico
1960) (dismissing for want of diversity) ; Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953); Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F.
Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Contra, Shatte v. International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (dictum),
aff'd on other grounds, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950). The district court opinion is criticized in Note, 59 YALE LJ. 575
(1950).
"61 Star. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958).
"Tisa v. Potofsky, 90 F. Supp. 175, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
[Vol. 41
LINCOLN MILLS
The court reached this conclusion while explicitly ignoring the issue
of whether section 301 (b) applies to all litigation in the federal
courts, or is instead restricted to "suits for violation of contracts"
instituted under section 301 (a). The latter conclusion seems
proper,44 for to conclude that section 301 (b) creates jural entities
of labor unions for purposes of all federal court litigation would
negate completely toward labor unions, instead of merely for pur-
poses of section 301 (a) litigation,45 the rule that "capacity to sue or
be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held," 48 which the lower federal courts laboriously have
puzzled out and applied to unincorporated labor associations on a
state-law by state-law basis.47 A contrary argument rests on the
"But see WoLLTT, LABOR RELATIONS AND FE mu.AL LAW 120 (1949).
,See Isbrandtsen Co. v. National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n,
9 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
,o FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). It should be noted that jural entity classification
by virtue of state law does not ipso facto confer citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction--citizenship of the individual members still controls.
Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 864 (1958), criticized on other grounds, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 559
(1959), Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1959); Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp.
456 (D.N.J. 1960) ; American Newspaper Guild v. MacKinnon, 108 F. Supp.
312 (D. Utah 1952) ; Murphy v. Hotel Employees Int'l Union, 102 F. Supp.
488- (E.D. Mich. 1952). But see American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213
F.2d 679, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954); 3 MooIy, op. cit.
supra note 36, 17.25, at 1413; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 742 n. 174
(1957). This happenstance need not continue if section 301 (b) is interpreted
to constitute labor union jural entities for purposes of all federal court litiga-
tion. But see WOLLE=r, op. cit. supra note 44, at 120. Nor does jural entity-
ship by virtue of state law affect the venue criterion which has been eased
at least for purposes of diversity of citizenship litigation alone.
"' Federal courts have read the laws of the following states to permit
unincorporated labor unions to sue and be sued as an entity: District of
Columbia, Busby v. Electric Util. Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1945); New Jersey, Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960);
Ohio, Williams v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 81 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio
1948), affd, 191 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952) ;
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Elec. Ry. Employees, 105 F. Supp. 537, 540 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Tennessee,
American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, svpra note 46; Virginia, AFL v.
Virginian Ry., 39 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1941). Unincorporated labor
unions have been held not suable according to the laws of the following states:
Arkansas, Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark.
1958), af'd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959);
Illinois, Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928, United Steelworkers,
152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1945); Kentucky, Lyons v. Saunders, 120 F. Supp.
392 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Missouri, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168
F.2d 182, 186 (8th Cir. 1948); New York, Isbrandtsen Co. v. National
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (by
implication); Oregon, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 233 F.2d 62 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Utah, American
Newspaper Guild v. MacKinnon, 108 F. Supp. 312 (D. Utah 1952). See
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theory that since a "federal question" now arises under section
301 (a) as a result of the Lincoln Mills decision, and since unincor-
porated labor unions already were constituted jural entities for pur-
poses of "federal question" litigation,4 it was unnecessary to enact
section 301(b) unless its purported scope was broader than the
federal question arising only under section 301 (a).'9
One answer- is that in holding that section 301 (a) creates ques-
tions of Substantive law, the Lincoln Mills majority opinion attrib-
uted to that section, insofar as Congress was concerned, "an occult
content." 50 These procedural rigors, assuming it is held that section
301 (b) does not make unincorporated labor unions jural entities
for purposes of all federal court litigation, emphasize the significance
of the doctrine that class actions survive the enactment of section
301 (a). 51
Once these procedural barriers are hurdled, one encounters the
problem of selecting the appropriate substantive law to govern the
outcome of the litigation. Assuming jurisdiction rests upon diver-
sity of citizenship, under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 2
the federal court must apply the outcome-determinative law which
would be applied by a court of the state in which the federal court
sits.53 This doctrine may have constitutional significance, for during
Justice Brandeis' explanation of why the Erie court had to overrule
the doctrine of the Swift v. Tyson 4 interpretation of section 34 of the
Judiciary Act, 5 he exclaimed that "the unconstitutionality of the
generally WoLLETT, op. cit. supra note 44, at 119. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, at 421, 477 (1948)."'FEm. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (1), codifying UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922).
"Cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 455 (1955) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). For
an analogous problem compare the service of process requirement of FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(d) (3), (7), with that of the Taft-Hartley Act § 301(d), 61 Stat.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(d) (1958). Clearly, process served in accord-
ance with section 301(d) is perfected, by virtue of Rule 4(d) (7). Wilson
& Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
But does Rule 4(d) (7) provide a valid alternative procedure, or further,
substitute section 301(d) as an exclusive procedure for perfecting service?
Moreover, does section 301(d) provide a service-of-process rule for all fed-
eral court litigation, or for merely that instigated under section 301 ?
"Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
" But see the qualification suggested by note 70 infra and accompanying
text.
"304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"See notes 32 and 33 supra and accompanying text.
"41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
"28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). The 1948 codification widened the original
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course pursued [under Swift v. Tyson] has now been made clear and
compels us to do so."'56 Whether one apologizes for the result be-
cause "Brandeis's standards of stare decisis could not easily be satis-
fied without putting the matter in terms of re-examining a constitu-
tional question,"5 7 or whether, because of the Court's subsequent
failure to clarify Justice Brandeis' phraseology, one discounts the
purported constitutional basis as "rather dubious dictum at best,"' s
both the basis for the doctrine and its scope are still unclear.59
act's language to include equity cases; whether Congress merely gilded the
lily by so doing is questionable. Compare Mason v. United States, 260 U.S.
545, 558-59 (1923), with Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940). Swift
v. Tyson held that only state statutory law was included as rules of decision
for the federal courts, and excepted state decisional law. Erie R.R. v. Tonmp-
kins removed the exception.
I' 304 U.S. at 77-78.
"' FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 73 (1949). See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 674-75 (1961) (dissenting opinion), "recog-
nizing that stare decisis carries different (i.e., less) weight in Constitutional
adjudication than it does in nonconstitutional decision.. ."
as Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427
(1958). A diluted constitutional basis for Erie, that it expresses "a coherent
and significant principle of federalism," has been suggested. See HART &
WECHSLER 633.
as Presumably Justice Brandeis' constitutional basis was twofold: He
asserted that "in applying the [Swift v. Tyson] doctrine this Court and the
lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several states." 304 U.S. at 80. This argument para-
phrases the tenth amendment and has historical support. See 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 199-200 (Hunt ed. 1906): "Such being the plan of the
Constitution, it cannot well be supposed that the Body which framed it with
so much deliberation ...would, if intending that the Common law should
be a part of the national code, have omitted to express or distinctly indicate
the intention . . . ." Also, in conferring choice of forum, and thereby choice
of substantive law, upon the non-resident plaintiff, Justice Brandeis concluded
that "the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law." 304 U.S.
at 75. It was this evil which stimulated the historical scholarship culminating
in Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 83 (1923). Justice Brandeis acknowledged this article
as the basis for his re-interpretation of the Judiciary Act, 304 U.S. at 73 n.5
(1938). However, Warren's article reveals no suggestion the Congress,
although it intended state decisional as well as state statutory law in the
operation of the Judiciary Act, felt constitutionally compelled to do so. While
the due process clause of the fifth amendment contains no mention of "equal
protection" in haec verba, and it is that amendment which regulates unfair
congressional legislation, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833), there has been recent scholarly appreciation of the "grow-
ing and overlapping role of the 'equal protection' and 'due process' clauses
which were joined ... in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . ..
BARR=TT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 594 (1958); and this
concept has received Supreme Court approval as applied to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
See generally BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 49-51
(1957). The extent to which this overlap occurs has vexed the lower federal
courts subsequently. Cf. Stagg, Mather & Hough v. Descartes, 244 F.2d 578
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Actions of an equitable nature present the most unsatisfactory
area in which this unclarity persists. Justice Frankfurter, whose
concepts of the Erie doctrine's significance have shifted,"0 once pur-
ported to define " 'the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise
of the authority . . . to administer equitable remedies, are bound to
follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies.' "01 But
in fact he held nothing of the kind; he held merely that if entrance
to a court of equity is barred by state law, it is likewise barred in a
federal court. Nothing was held purporting to control the exercise
of a federal chancellor's conscience once it was legitimately invoked,
although he did republish, as dictum, 62 language that "the enforce-
ment in the Federal courts of new equitable rights created by States
is subject to the qualification that such enforcement must not impair
any right conferred, or conflict with any inhibition imposed, by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."
' 3
Even the "carefully considered"6 dictum in the more recent case
of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.65 lends credence to the doctrine's
blanket equitable application, but commentators disagree on whether
the language of the majority66 and concurring67 opinions indicates
(1st Cir. 1957). One court has been presented with, but avoided ruling on,
a contention that any federally-authorized action which constitutes any un-
equal protection per se violates due process. NLRB v. Gene Compton's Corp.,
262 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1959). A more moderate view is "that the arbitrari-
ness of a classification, if it is bad enough, may be a violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment even though that contains no equal
protection clause." Pacific Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 276 F.2d 350, 353 (9th
Cir. 1960).
o Compare Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 530 (1928): "Legislation
should remove this doctrine.. .", with Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert,
348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.): "The
availability of federal tribunals for controversies concerning matters which
in themselves are outside federal power and exclusively within state authority,
is the essence of a jurisdiction solely resting on the fact that a plaintiff and
a defendant are citizens of different States."
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), quoting from Russell
v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 294 (1940).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 61, at 107 n.4.
s Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121, 127 (1930).
,Hill, supra note 58, at 431.
s 350 U.S. 198 (1956). But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (concurring opinion).
" 350 U.S. at 202 (Douglas, J.) : "If respondent's contention is correct,
a constitutional question might be presented. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins
indicated that congress does not have the constitutional authority to make the
law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases."
"Id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J.) : "[lit would raise a serious question of
constitutional law whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation
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a willingness to resubscribe to a constitutional basis underlying
Erie.68
The discussion retains a significance transcending the academic,
for a constitutional basis underlying Erie paralyzes a federal court
attempting to implement a national labor relations policy of substan-
tive law governing collective bargaining agreements. This has led to
suggestions, for example, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act could not
constitutionally be applied in a diversity of citizenship case,69 and
that, assuming class suits are forbidden by state law against unin-
corporated labor unions, they may be likewise barred in a federal
court by a constitutionally-mandated Erie doctrine. 7
0
It is true that the Court of late, with precedential support, 71 has
departed from the Erie doctrine in maintaining traditional federal
standards of judge-jury fact-finding functions.72 This aberration
has been rationalized on the ground that
the likelihood of different results being reached by a state
judge and a federal jury deciding the same factual question
was not so great as to require the federal practice of jury
determination to yield to the state rule in the interest of uni-
formity of outcome.7"
But this analysis inadequately explains subsequent action in the
lower federal courts triggered by the Court's decision: holdings, for
example, that the amenability of a foreign corporation to process
requires a federal standard;74 that admissibility of crucial evidence
in the federal courts which is there solely because it is 'between Citizens of
different States' .... ." Compare Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the
Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 191 (1957), with Mish-
kin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rnv. 797, 799
n.9 (1957).
"See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements under Taft-
Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 185 n.78 (1956). But cf. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (dictum); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner
& Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
0 Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1182, 1192 (1959).
Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
' Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
8 The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REV. 77, 150 (1958).
But see Freidelbaum, The Warren Court and American Federalism--A Pre-
liminary Appraisal, 28 U. CuIx. L. REv. 53, 65 (1960).
" Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
But cf. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v, Mer-
chants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U,S, 530 (1949).
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would be unaffected by state rules purporting to govern.7 These
holdings, which would seem to make light of Erie's constitutional
credentials, appear to defy categorization in terms of their potential
effect upon the outcome of the litigation. Prior to these cases, appli-
cation of the Erie doctrine in proportion to its likelihood of affecting
the outcome had been submitted as a standard for its invocation.
70
Assuming, then, that a plaintiff can satisfy entrance requirements
to both "federal question" and "diversity of citizenship" jurisdiction
of a federal district court, he has become "master to decide what
[substantive] law he will rely upon." 77  Indeed, under the doctrine
of Hum v. Oursler,78 separate jurisdictional grounds to adjudicate a
state claim need not be shown once federal question jurisdiction
exists. Possibly plaintiff may join his section 301 action with a
separately-conceived injury emanating from violation of state law.70
Particularly is this true in a case where a tort action is joined with
the section 301 suit because the rule that federal administrative re-
dress does not pre-empt common law tort actions by employers 0 and
employees8" against labor unions, given a context of violence or
threats thereof," has been extended to hold that section 301 likewise
does not pre-empt state common law tort actions.88  Some restric-
tions do exist, for it has been held that a section 301 action against
the union bars joinder of a common law class action against the
" Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). This ques-
tion involves the interplay between FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), and the Erie doc-
trine; see Hill, supra note 58, at 433-34. The fifth circuit assumed, without
deciding, that a state statute governing a statement's admissibility for im-
peachment purposes would have been applied by a state court, to exclude the
statement, but nevertheless snubbed the statute. This technique is question-
able in the light of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Ac-
cord, Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681, 687 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1961) (2-1 decision).
' See HART & WECHSLER 660.
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). The
law may be the same, which makes the issue moot. See Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Local 1291, Int'l Lohgshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953).
'8 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
See generally Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies,
71 HARV. L. Rxv. 513 (1958).
" United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
" International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958);
International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); see 69 YALE
L.J. 309 (1958).
8' See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
"' Lucas Flour Co. v. Teamsters Union, 57 Wash. 2d 95, 356 P.2d 1
(1960), aff'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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membership, in which the union leadership was denominated repre-
sentatives of the class as well as individual defendants ;84 similarly,
an employer may not join his section 301 action with one against the
union leaders solely in their individual capacity." However, the
existence of a separate suit against the individual leaders pending in
a state court could leave a concurrent section 301 suit against the
entity in a federal court unaffected. 8
Should plaintiff decide to elect between, rather than join, his
state and federal claims, the problem becomes one of determining
which of these choices plaintiff has elected. Normally, "where it
appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to
relief depends upon . . the laws of the United States," T a federal
question is presented. Assuming this rule is applicable in a choice-
of-law as well as a jurisdictional context, not only should the court
usually ignore surrounding documents such as the defendant's answer
or petition for removal in making this determination, 8 but may
ignore the part of the complaint forming the prayer for relief.8 9
This rule that the federal court looks solely at the plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint in determining the existence of a federal question
is "deceptively simple," 90 particularly when applied to section 301
state law choice-of-law determinations. Removal and original juris-
diction cases may be considered indiscriminately. 1 The earlier cases
held that if section 301 was not explicitly set forth in the complaint as
the ground for relief relied upon," or if diversity of citizenship and
" Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809 (N.D.
Iowa 1960). Distinguish this situation of a section 30 1 (a) suit joined with
a class action from that where a class action is the alternative and substitute
remedy for a section 301 (a) suit. Cf. notes 42-44 supra and accompanying
text.,, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). The motivation
for the multiple litigation is provided by section 301 (b) : "Any money judg-
ment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against
its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual members or his
assets."
"' International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local 343, Int'l Union, UAW, 123
F. Supp. 683 (D.N.J. 1954).
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). But see Fay v. Ameri-
can Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
:'Cf. Goldberg v. Stevens, 184 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
i' See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLuM.
L. REv. 157, 176 (1953).
" See Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
"Abrams v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.C. 1949);
H. N. Thayer Co. v. Binnall, 82 F. Supp. 566 (D. Mass. 1949).
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alleged section 301 jurisdiction were both set forth, 3 state law pre-
sumably governed. These holdings can be explained on the ground
that they occurred before the formulation of the doctrine that a sepa-
rate body of federal substantive labor law evolved from section 301.
More recent decisions evidence a milder view: that litigants relying
on federal law need not say so in haec verba, but need merely plead
facts evidencing such reliance.94 Thus the plaintiff who draws his
complaint artfully enough may be able to force the issue of which
substantive law will govern the outcome of the litigation, provided
that the state substantive law of collective bargaining agreements has
not been pre-empted by section 301.
At the outset, it must be noted that pre-emption is the exception
to the following rule:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely
occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all par-
ticipation by the legal systems of the states. This was plainly
true in the beginning when the federal legislative product
[including the Constitution] was extremely small .... Fed-
eral legislation, on the whole, has been . . .drafted on an
ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon
legal relationships established by the states, altering or sup-
planting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose.
Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total
corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legisla-
ture acts against the background of the common law, assumed
to govern unless changed by legislation.9
Occasionally, Congress spells out the operative state law background
of its legislative product, as, for example, when it provides that
governmental liability for its employees' negligence shall be "in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.""8 But Congress never tells when its decrees are to sweep
" International Woodworkers v. McCloud River Lumber Co., 119 F. Supp.
475 (N.D. Cal. 1953); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United Office &
Professional Workers, 93 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.J. 1950).
"National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); cf. Produce Terminal Realty Corp. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116
F. Supp. 451 (D. Mass. 1953), holding that facts alleged, rather than law
expressly relied upon, determines existence of federal question under the ICC
Act.
'5 HART & WEcHSLER 435.
o0 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
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the field clear of other regulation,9 7 and the Court has recognized
that revelation of this congressional aim is a judicial function."
Less clear is this pre-existing background of relationships in the
field of labor relations; it might almost be said that labor relations is
the exception to the exception of pre-emption. Congressional promul-
gations such as "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce," 9 and "employees shall have the right., to en-
gage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection 100 are words worth hewing in rock.
The twenty-year interval between them refutes the notion of ad hoc
legislation in favor of a constant government reappraisal of the pat-
tern emergent from the interweaving of various threads in the na-
tional economic fabric, and a periodic legislative re-adjustment of
that pattern, for example in 1947 and 1959. Thus it has been sub-
mitted that at least "since the enactment [of the Wagner Act] in
1935, federal pre-emption of the labor-management relations field
has proceeded without abatement."' 0 ' But the depth of congressional
feeling, manifested in the doctrine of pre-emption, falls short of the
whole story; equally significant is the breadth of the sweep of the
congressional transit. For example, the collective bargaining pro-
visions of the original Wagner Act, albeit the keystone of effort in
"an area in which the national government has labored hard and
long,"'0 2 arguably intended to create the relationship only of manda-
tory collective bargaining; administrative apparatus was not estab-
lished to supervise the content of collective bargaining agreements,
nor, in fact, even to insure that agreement would be forthcoming
from the negotiations, but merely to insure that the ceremony of
collective bargaining in good faith took place without a hitch.
10 3
'TSee 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1224, 1225 n.6 (1960).
98 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
"Clayton Anti-Trust Act § 6; 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
00 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958).
.1 Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959:
II, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1089 (1960); see Friedelbaum, supra note 73,
at 58.
102 Mishkin, supra note 90, at 196.
... See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-09 (1952)
(dictum); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Cox,
Federalisn in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAiv. L. REV. 1297, 1325
(1954). The thrust of Professor (now Solicitor-General) Cox's article is
the interplay between federal administrative law and state administrative and
statutory law. Some of his considerations remain apropos when applied to
an analysis of the relationship between federal and state decisional law as it
develops in the labor relations field.
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The actual process of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement
is "in practice a highly variable process, shaped by the parties and
by the conditions they face."'
0 4
An extension of this analysis of the pattern of federal regulation
leads to the conclusion that Congress in enacting section 301 meant
not to substitute federal standards and suppress state standards of
accountability for violation of collective bargaining agreements.
Rather, the impression is gathered that accountability alone, regard-
less of its characteristics, was sought to be created. Carried to its
conclusion this analysis reveals that state standards were intended
to be the sole measure of accountability, a conclusion seemingly fore-
closed by Lincoln Mills were it not for the juxtaposition in recent
opinions of congressional purpose and congressional intent without
an explanation of how the manifestation of congressional intent ex-
emplified in the Lincoln Mills case implements the congressional pur-
pose.I05 There is some heady legislative history on point created
by both proponents and opponents of the measure. 06 This may be
inadmissible evidence of the congressional intent insofar as the pro-
ponents are concerned because it is not included in the committee
reports, which in the past have marked the boundary of a legitimate
inquiry into legislative history ;107 insofar as statements by the oppo-
sition are concerned "it is the sponsors that we look to when the
meaning of the statutory words is in doubt."' 08
One must appreciate, assuming arguendo that the field of labor
... CoMMITrEE FOR EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 31 (1961).
' Compare the language in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502, 508-09 (1962) : "The legislative history makes clear that the basic pur-
pose of § 301 (a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums
for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations," with that in
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962): "[W]e can-
not but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." See Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations:
II, 59 CouuM. L. REv. 269 (1959).
" Compare the remarks of Senator Taft, co-author of the bill, 93 CONG.
REc. 7690 (1947), and those of Senator Ball, the bill's floor manager, 93
CONG. REc. 5014 (1947), with those of the bill's opposition, summarized in
57 YAE LJ. 630, 633 (1948).
10' Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396
(1951) (concurring opinion). However, the Charles Dowd opinion, itself,
in support of its holding, resorted to statements on the floor of Congress. 368
U.S. at 512. See generally DOWLING, PATTERSON & POWELL, MATERIALS
FOR LEGAL METHOD 325 n.2 (2d ed. 1952).




relations lends itself to the application of traditional concepts of pre-
emption, that in applying those traditional concepts "there can be
no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula."' 9  The last com-
prehensive Supreme Court definition of the criteria for pre-emption
has set forth three such criteria n" although the relative weight which
should be accorded each is as yet unclear."'
The first criterion is the pervasiveness of the congressional regu-
latory enactment which is alleged to have pre-empted the field.
Application of this standard argues against pre-emption on the
ground that it took the Lincoln Mills litigation to manifest the
existence of any congressionally-spelled-out regulatory pattern, let
alone the pervasiveness of any such congressional design.
The second criterion is the dominant federal interest involved.
Concededly, Congress has an interest in minimizing "industrial strife
which interferes with the normal flow of commerce .... But
the question is whether the mere ultimate uniformity of substantive
rules of decision-which must inevitably climax pre-emption-
serves, in the light of the possibility of some alternative rules for
decision, a dominant federal interest. One argument favoring uni-
form regulation has noted that it will serve to check unbridled rivalry
among the states tending to formulate a substantive law of collective
bargaining agreements stressing a particular appeal to immigrant
industry. This has, in fact, been the result" 3 of the "right-to-work"
exemption of the Taft-Hartley Act," 4 which permits state regulation
of union-shop agreements" 5 and which has created problems of even
an intra-state nature."6 Hence its repeal has been urged.117 How-
ever, is the possibility that unfair laws formulated by overly-enthusi-
' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
110 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). See I(KumER, CoxsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 504 (2d ed. 1954).
See 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1224, 1228-29 n.31 (1960).
1 Taft-Hartley Act § 1(b), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b)(195 
8).(195 8ox Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv.
1297, 1303 (1954).
'61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
1' Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rlv.
1297, 1303, 1397 (1954); Johannesen, Recent Decisions Concerning the
Agency Shop, 40 N.C.L. REv. 603 (1962); see Note, The Agency Shop,
Federal Law, and the Right to Work States, 71 YALE L.J. 330 (1961).
110 See Burke & Brun, Local Right to Work Ordinances, A New Problem
in Labor and Local Law, 9 STAN. L. REv. 674 (1957) ; Finman, Local "Right
to Work" Ordinances: A Reply, 10 STAN. L. REv. 53 (1957).
1"7 Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HA&av. L. REv.
1297, 1320 (1954).
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astic states will be redressed in time, for example, by new voting
patterns or an emigration of disgruntled workers, so remote as to
provoke prospective rather than corrective federal regulation? Has
the experience with analogous state "right-to-work" legislation run
a sufficient course of time so as to provide an affirmative answer
with certainty? Assuming the likelihood of this eventual socio-
political redress, and assuming that federal regulation is intended
to be corrective only until it takes place, the latter will not fill the
time-gap created by the former. Rather, the realization of the two
reliefs will coincide, rather than follow each other in sequence."'
This is because of the peculiar unsuitability of the lower federal
courts to accomplish the task of formulation and administration of
a substantive labor law which the Court has said Congress set for
them." 9 One can, and the Lincoln Mills court did, appreciate con-
gressional reluctance to place contractual violations in the hands of
the National Labor Relations Board by denominating them unfair
labor practices, 2 ' which was a justifiable legislative technique be-
cause the delay inherent in NLRB proceedings generally'' reaches
appalling proportions in the case of unfair labor practice proceed-
ings.122 Also, NLRB proceedings have unreliable precedential
valuei2 and exhibit a lack of clarity which tends to confuse those
seeking an authoritative guide.' 24 But it does not follow, for the
reasons given, that the lower federal courts will do the task either
better or more quickly. It appears that an assertion of "the para-
mount federal policy of uniformity"' 25 not only cannot expeditiously
.. e note 17 supra and accompanying text; Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
119 Id. at 456; see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judi-
cial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAgv. L. Rnv. 1 (1957).
1201 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS Acr, 1947, at 545-46 (1948).
1.. See Rothman, The National Labor Relations Board and Administrative
Law, 29 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 301, 316-17 (1960); Note, 53 COLUM. L. Rnv.
258, 265 (1953).
... See report of the special subcommittee of the House Labor Committee,
excerpted in N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1961, p. 20, col. 4 (city ed.). One re-
gional office has asserted that it is not responsible for delays. See statement
of the central and northern New Jersey regional director quoted in the
Newark Evening News, Jan. 15, 1961, p. 8, col. 7 (7-star ed.).
.2. Compare General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Sept. 29,1 961),
with General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961), both discussed in
Johannesen, supra, note 115.
12 Compare In the Nation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1961, p. 34, col. 4, with id.
Oct. 20, 1961, p. 32, col. 4 (late city ed.).
"' Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of Labor Agreement, 7
STAx. L. Rtv. 445, 452 (1955). This pre-Lincoin Mills thesis concludes,
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be brought about but, standing alone, exemplifies the major premise
of unarticulated public policy.
126
A qualitative approach to exclusive federal control of collective
bargaining already has been suggested, for example, for the area of
national defense."r Perhaps the Supreme Court, should attempt,
via the judicial process, to formulate similarly-qualitative solutions
to the problem just as Congress, on both an ad hoc and a permanent
basis, has provided through legislation. The ad hoc approach per-
mits the President to arrange an 80-day, injunction-supported "cool-
ing off period" whenever, in the President's court-confirmed esti-
mate, a strike or lockout "will-imperil the national health or
safety."' 28  This has been upheld against constitutional attack on
grounds of violation of separation of powers, 2 ' violation of freedom
of speech, due process, or voluntary servitude, 30 or violation of the
requirement that a "case or controversy" exist before a federal court
may act.' 3 ' Exemplifying a permanent qualitative approach is the
exemption of the construction and apparel industries& 32 from the
"secondary-boycott"' 3 and "hot-cargo" '34 prohibitions imposed by
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act." 5  These likewise have been
however, that notwithstanding the desirability of uniformity, section 301's
failure to mandate federal substantive law explicitly should preclude the
Supreme Court from doing so.120 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881).
..7 Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAJv. L. :Rsv.
1297, 1302-03 (1954).1. Taft-Hartley Act §§ 206-08, 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-78
(1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 178 (Supp. 1961).
29 United States v. United Steelworkers, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 915 (1953).
... United States v. International Union, UMW, 89 F. Supp. 187 (D.D.C.
1950), appeal dismissed as moot, 190 F.2d 865 (1951); United States v.
International Longshoremen's Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
.. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (per cu-riara).
l22Taft-Hartley Act (Landrum-Griffin Amendment) § 704(b), 73 Stat.
525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. III, 1961).
12373 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (Supp. 111, 1961).
1'73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. 1I, 1961); see Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: II, 73 HARv.
L. Rav. 1086, 1112-21 (1960); Farmer, The Status and Application of the
Secondary Boycott and Hot-Cargo Provisions, in The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: Interpretations and Implications, 48
GEo. L.J. 205, 327-45 (1959) ; Fleming, Title VII, The Taft-Hartley Amend-
meits, in The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959:
A Symposium, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 659, 666, 685-94 (1960).
1.. See sources cited in note 134 supra; Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amend-
wents to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 257 (1959) ;
Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46
VA. L. REv. 195 (1960).
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upheld."8' But no such qualitative approach appears vis-A-vis the
litigation of alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements.
Nor does it satisfy the requirements of a qualitative analysis that
federal rules of conduct will apply only in interstate commerce, for
"it is sometimes said, with only minimum exaggeration, that there is
no business in which employment relations are not potentially sub-
ject to federal control."'
3 7
The third pre-emption criterion-potential conflict of administra-
tion and law between state and federal agencies' 3 -- represents the
most valid ground for substituting federal for state rules of accounta-
bility; particularly has this manifested itself in the field of labor
relations." 9 Whether one expresses the view that this conflict in
law and administration merits pre-emption because conflict would
be "intolerable,"'"4 because conflict would resurrect an evil com-
parable to the at least quasi-constitutional one corrected by Erie v.
Tompkins,'' or on the full-fledged constitutional ground that "no
competing state law could survive under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution,"' 4' pre-emption does seem ordained if only upon this
possibility of conflict of law and administration.
... Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294
(N.D. Cal. 1960).
... Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REy.
1297, 1299 (1954). Professor Cox favored administrative pre-emption, id.
at 1315-17, notwithstanding that "federal regulation has been extended too
far, leaving too little to state control." Id. at 1305. However, he also
favored pre-emption by federal substantive law, id. at 1338, but was con-
sidering the problem in a wholly hypothetical context, because he thought
"it adds a good deal to the words (of § 301) to read in an instruction to the
district courts to develop a body of substantive law. It adds immeasurably
more to infer that the federal law should be exclusive .... ." Id. at 1338-39.
. The standard of potential conflict may represent a shift from the former
standard of actual conflict. See 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 1224, 1228-29 n.31 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
140 Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. R~v.
1297, 1338 (1954).
... Wollett & Wellington, supra note 125, at 452; see Meltzer, The Su-
preme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II, 59
CoLum. L. Rav. 269, 279-80 (1959).
142 Bickel & Wellington, supra note 119, at 9; see also Meltzer, supra note
141, at 276.
... At this point some clarification in terminology may prove useful.
Problems of supremacy traditionally arise when, in a given case, state and
federal rules dictate conflicting results. A valid federal rule will prevail. If
the Lincoln Mills principle is construed narrowly so that federally-formulated
rules apply only when jurisdiction is founded on § 301 (see Fa. R. Civ. P.
8(a) (1), and text accompanying notes 90-94 supra) no direct conflict results
if jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship. Given a broad inter-
pretation of the Lincoln Mills principle, that is, federal law governs all col-
lective bargaining agreement litigation in the federal courts, one must assume
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The Lincoln Mills principle contemplates a potential vivid and
far-reaching power shift from the state to the federal arena. This
thought has already been expressed ad nauseam--it suffices to say
that the Lincoln Mills court itself was alerted to a misgiving aware-
ness of this."' But by hypothesis, a pre-emptive Lincoln Mills prin-
ciple assures an aggravation of that shift, for which there is no
demonstrable dominant federal purpose in justification. For this
political reason, even more than because of the oddities of statutory
synthesis and difficulties of judical administration discussed earlier,
the Lincoln Mills principle should either be overridden by the Con-
gress or overruled by the Supreme Court.
The Lincoln Mills principle's main attraction is a technical one:
it may serve to protect section 301's constitutionality. The argument
has been made that if state law applies of its own force under section
301, the section as enacted is incompatible with the limits of the
judicial power of the United States imposed by article 3 of the Con-
stitution. 45 Indeed, the Lincoln Mills majority was accused of
in this context a non-constitutional Erie doctrine, for a constitutional Erie
doctrine as applied here forbids such a wide application of the Lincoln Mills
principle. In order to preclude a chaotic regulatory scheme in cases where
there is no present direct conflict, and to prevent these problems from arising
upon the capricious niceties of pleading, a pre-emptive law of federally-
fashioned rules for litigating obligations under collective bargaining agree-
ments would operate prospectively by sweeping away state law purporting to
operate of its own force instead of waiting for each case to arise which might
engender direct conflict, such as where a broad application of the Lincoln
Mills principle conflicts with state law in the context of a non-constitutional
Erie doctrine. Note that the court would be pre-empting state law not to
advance a congressional regulatory scheme, but its own. Congress to the
rescue might provide, for example, that for purposes of diversity-of-citizen-
ship jurisdiction to litigate a collective bargaining agreement a labor union
in an industry affecting commerce shall not be considered a citizen of any
state.
1" 353 U.S. at 464, 484 (dissenting opinion).
... Id. at 469-94 (dissenting opinion). But see id. at 460 (concurring
opinion). The concurring opinion (per Burton and Harlan, JJ.) raises
interesting questions. While purportedly subscribing to the theory that Con-
gress can invest the federal courts with "protective jurisdiction," over collec-
tive bargaining agreement litigation, the opinion neglected to state upon
which ground such "protective jurisdiction" could be reconciled with the
constitutional limitations of article 3. There are at least four such purported
reconciliations: (1) that Congress, in the valid exercise of its article 1
powers, may confer jurisdiction upon federal courts beyond the limits of
article 3. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582 (1949) (plurality opinion) ; (2) that, since the judicial power of article
3 is at least co-extensive with the legislative, in any situation, such as the
litigation of collective bargaining agreements, where Congress could provide
the substantive rule for decision but chose not to, Congress may alternatively
enact a mere jurisdictional statute while eschewing its substantive power.
See HART & WECHLSER 371. This approach would interpret the words of ar-
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formulating the Lincoln Mills principle in order to preclude just such
an attack on section 301's constitutionality.'40 Assuming, arguendo,
the validity of this constitutional attack, this alternative solution to
the problem is proposed: Congress, in the exercise of its wide powers
under the commerce clause,147 should enact legislation which would
create, of labor unions "representing employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce," jural entities capable of suing or being sued on col-
lective bargaining agreements in the courts of the several states. 48
This solution differs from other approaches to the problem-for
tide 3 "arising under ... the Laws of the United States" to read "which could
arise under the laws of the United States"; (3) "that cases arising under
the laws of the United States, within the meaning of Article III, include not
only those which are governed on the merits, in whole or in part, by validly
established federal rules of decision, statutory or otherwise, but also those
brought pursuant to a valid federal statute enacted to prevent the possibility
of discrimination against federally-protectible interests." HART & WECHSLER
372. Under this theory, a bald grant of jurisdiction would be elevated to the
status of such "a valid federal statute enacted to prevent the possibility of
discrimination against federally-protectible interests"; (4) that if Congress
has already legislated substantively in an area, Congress should be permitted
to surround adjacent litigation not governed by substantive federal law with
protective jurisdiction in order that under the laws of the United States the
entire congressional policy in the area may benefit from the institutional
characteristics of the federal courts. See Mishkin, The Federal "Questionr"
in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 157, 184-96 (1953). This theory
assumes exploitation of the institutional characteristics of the lower federal
courts for the benefit of collective bargaining agreement litigation was an
end sought by Congress in enacting section 301. A differing appraisal of
the problem which prompted the enactment of section 301, see note 105 supra
and accompanying text, would conclude that the federal courts were brought
into play not for their institutional differences but rather as an alternative
and possibly runner-up choice of forum because of the inability of unions to
litigate as jural entities in the state courts. The dissent of Justice Frank-
furter appraised and rejected all four theories.
A second aspect of the concurring opinion is that "protective jurisdiction"
presumes the application of state substantive law. The Lincoln Mills court
held that collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate are specifically en-
forceable. But, under relevant state law, that is, Alabama, such agreements
are unenforceable. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. The concur-
rence nevertheless approved the result on the ground that "having jurisdic-
tion over the suit, the court was not powerless to fashion an appropriate
federal remedy. The power to decree specific performance of a collective
bargaining agreement to arbitrate finds its source in § 301 itself, and in a
Federal District Court's inherent equitable powers .... ." Presumably, then,
this analysis provides an exception to blanket application of state remedial
law in cases of protective jurisdiction which is the converse of that existing
vis-a-vis application of the Erie doctrine. See note 62 supra and accompany-
ing text.
1' 353 U.S. at 460-61 (dissenting opinion).
... See generally Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce,
41 A.B.A.J. 823 (1955).
14 See Hearings on H.R. 4908 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1947), the
Case Bill which was vetoed by President Truman,
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example, compulsory incorporation of labor unions as federal cor-
porations-in that it is calculated to have no effect beyond solving
the problem of securing union accountability for and providing union
enforceability of the terms of their collective bargaining agreements.
By contrast, federally-incorporated labor unions, while barred from
litigating in federal court causes of action arising under state law,
absent independent grounds of federal jurisdiction, 49 would be con-
stituted jural entities for purposes of all causes of action arising under
state law and enforceable in state courts. A glance at section 301's
face reveals that this development would outstrip the congressional
purpose: that causes of action arising out of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement were the only causes of action which enjoyed
congressional pre-occupation.
Simultaneously with this creation of labor unions as jural entities
for purposes of collective bargaining agreement litigation in the state
courts, entry into a federal forum of that portion of collective bar-
gaining litigation compliant with the prevailing statutory grant of
jurisdiction in force up to the limits of article 3 could remain undis-
turbed. It is true that the power of Congress, which under the
commerce clause is potentially plenary in withdrawing litigational or
remedial jurisdiction among the state courts, 50 may be somewhat
less than plenary in compelling state courts to take jurisdiction pro-
hibited by state law.'"' It follows that this proposal may be vul-
1" See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1958).
10 So long as accomplished with constitutional limits. See HART &
WEcHSLER 339-40.
.. Compare note 30 supra and accompanying text, with Justice Holmes'
dictum in Douglas v. New York, N.J. & H. Ry., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929),
where he said: "As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability
Act, that statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits
arising under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority
of the United States is concerned. It may very well be that if the Supreme
Court of New York were given no discretion, being otherwise competent,
it would be subject to a duty. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress
that purports to force a duty upon such courts as against an otherwise valid
excuse." (Emphasis added.) The problemi may turn on the scope of the
phrase "being otherwise competent." If by this one means, for example,"otherwise competent as a court of general jurisdiction," then the proposed
legislation would prevail over state action aimed solely at excluding unin-
corporated labor unions as jural entities in the state courts. If, by contrast,
the quoted phrase were interpreted to mean, in this context, "otherwise com-
petent to entertain suits against unincorporated labor unions as entities,"
then state courts would be permitted to refuse the suit since they would not
be scrutinizing the scope of the restraining state law but would be deaf to
such suits against unions as jural entities across the board. Read narrowly,
justice Holmes' language thus becomes merely a precursor of the doctrine that
state courts may not discriminate against claims founded in federal law. See
note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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nerable to hostile state legislatures which decide to withdraw juris-
diction from their courts to hear suits by and against labor unions
which have been constituted jural entities.
But there is insufficient warrant for a presumption of this hos-
tility. It is arguable that the traditional inability of an unincor-
porated labor union to sue or be sued as an entity stemmed, not from
procedural statutes enacted by state legislatures, but rather from a
lethargic failure on the part of the judiciary of the several states to
renovate their notions of permissible procedural law to compensate
for shifts in our social and economic structure.' This solution
would advance the true "dominant federal purpose" of accountability,
no matter, within reason, the terms upon which it takes place.
Even if it should come to pass that an overriding, all-pervasive
federal common law of collective bargaining contractual obligations
is required, "congressional solutions . .. reflect a healthy tradition
under which basic political decisions are made and changed by
avowedly political agencies."' 153 The Supreme Court disagrees; it
concludes the Charles Dowd opinion: "It is implicit in the choice
Congress made that 'diversities and conflicts' may occur .... To
resolve and accommodate such diversities and conflicts is one of the
traditional functions of this court."' 54  The Supreme Court should
be presented with opportunities to exercise this "traditional function"
very shortly.
.2 See Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincor-
porated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 42 n.9 (1941).
..3 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction
Over Labor Relations: II, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 269, 302 (1959).
15 368 U.S. at 514.
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